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THE DYNAMICS OF CONTRACTUAL AND RELATIONAL 
GOVERNANCE: EVIDENCE FROM LONG-TERM PUBLIC-
PRIVATE PROCUREMENT ARRANGEMENTS 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the detail and dynamics of how contractual and 
relational governance mechanisms are deployed in managing complex, long-
term public-private supply arrangements. Using empirical data from two UK 
Private Finance Initiative (PFI) cases, the paper analyses the interplay of 
governance mechanisms along a timeline of project phases. Conceptual and 
practical findings confirm that relational and contractual mechanisms are 
indeed complementary forms of exchange governance but also that the 
relational intentions of all parties frame whether the contract is interpreted as 
a written sign of distrust or commitment. Equally, relational and contractual 
governance follow different development paths: both follow cumulative 
trajectories but (a) inter-personal relational mechanisms are more incremental 
and fragile, whereas (b) contractual mechanisms move with fewer degrees of 
freedom and ‘anchor’ the exchange throughout the life cycle. Finally, the 
different development characteristics of relational and contractual 
mechanisms mean that their dynamic interplay does not follow consistent 
patterns. The paper concludes with suggestions for more longitudinal studies. 
 
Keywords: Public private partnership, long-term relationship, contractual 
and relational governance 
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1. Introduction 
This paper contributes to a debate about the dynamics of inter-organisational 
governance. It explores the detail of contractual and relational governance 
mechanisms and their changing significance over time through an 
investigation of the management of long-term arrangements between public 
buyers and private service providers. Previous studies have suggested that 
contractual and relational governance need to be considered as 
complementary mechanisms (Ferguson et al., 2005; Poppo and Zenger, 2002) 
but very little work has explored the details and dynamics of this interplay 
(Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005). Specifically, this paper aims to develop a 
richer understanding of the detailed composition of these mechanisms and 
their contingent interplay over the life of an exchange relationship. This will 
contribute to better aggregate conceptualisation and theory building and 
generate more meaningful practical guidance. 
In order to access the phenomena two long-term supply arrangements have 
been investigated; both are UK Private Finance Initiative (PFI) design-build-
finance-operate contracts with a 25- and 30-year lifespan respectively. A key 
consideration in selecting PFI arrangements as the empirical focus of the 
research was the opportunity this provided to review specific supply 
arrangements over an extended period of time. In other words, the buyer-
supplier ‘lock-in’ inherent in Public-Private Partnership (PPP)/PFI actually 
makes it particularly useful for exploring exchange dynamics. The next 
section presents the conceptual background to different contractual and 
relational governance mechanisms and their interplay over time. 
Additionally, the specific governance challenges of public-private 
relationships are reviewed. The third and fourth sections describe the 
methodology and case findings. The final section presents the main 
conclusions and implications for future research. 
 
2. Conceptual background 
This section draws upon a range of literature to explore relational and 
contractual governance as both discrete and complementary constructs. 
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Additionally, the section summarises some of the key literature on PPP/PFI 
procurement arrangements; especially where this research touches upon the 
paper’s core conceptual concerns. 
 
2.1. Contractual governance 
Arguably the dominant theoretical logic for explaining inter-organizational 
exchange is the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) perspective. Assuming 
opportunism and bounded rationality (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997), TCE 
asserts that firms attempt to minimize transaction costs by “assigning 
transactions (which differ in their attributes) to governance structures (the 
adaptive capacities and associated costs of which differ) in a discriminating 
way” (Williamson, 1985, p. 18). As a result, organizations only internalise 
activities where adverse costs might arise from operational difficulties in a 
market exchange, primarily driven by uncertainty, frequency of exchange, 
and asset-specificity1. Furthermore, TCE argues that parties have to 
safeguard against the hazard of opportunism by applying legal contracts, 
specifying what is acceptable and what is not, with threats of legal 
enforcement or non-legal retribution (Williamson, 1975). 
‘Classical’ contract theory assumes that complete contracts can be drafted 
(Lyons and Metha, 1997), that is containing all the necessary safeguards to 
mitigate opportunistic behaviour and reduce transactional ambiguity by clear 
specification of what is and what is not allowed within a relationship (Lui 
and Ngo, 2004). For example, increasing the risks associated with 
opportunistic behaviour by stipulating penalties that change the pay-off 
structure (Parkhe, 1993). Conceptually close to TCE, an optimal contract 
means one with the lowest transaction costs relative to outcome. 
In practice however, drafting costs and asymmetric information render most 
contracts “incomplete”. Equally, contracting can only define remedies for 
foreseeable contingencies and/or at best specify processes for resolving 
unforeseeable outcomes (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). Incomplete contracts 
                                               
1 An asset is transaction specific if its value in a transaction with another party is reduced and 
correspondingly, the larger the value ‘gap’ between its best and best-alternative use, the 
greater the specificity of the asset. 
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contain non-legally enforceable and/or poorly specified intentions, promises, 
and conditions that may easily by misinterpreted by the courts (Deakin and 
Wilkinson, 1998). Consequently, an incomplete contract is defined ‘as an 
agreement that goes beyond what is verifiable’ (Chen, 2000, p.211). 
Interestingly, although incomplete contracts inevitably offer less certainty 
(i.e. fewer legal safeguards) for the contracting parties, non ‘legally 
enforceable’ elements of an incomplete contract can still provide elements of 
formal control, by indicating limits of acceptability. Moreover, because gaps 
in an incomplete contract are only filled as contingencies arise, they can 
actually underpin greater flexibility in the execution of a supply agreement 
(Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005). 
Contracts are central to most supply arrangements: providing a legally bound, 
institutional framework in which each party’s rights, duties, and 
responsibilities are codified; and goals, policies and strategies underlying the 
relationship are specified. Although emphasis is normally placed on the 
prevention of inappropriate agent behaviour (e.g. opportunism), these formal 
agreements can facilitate effective exchange (Carson et al., 2006; Luo, 2002). 
 
2.2. Relational governance 
Although TCE may provide the dominant economic logic for determining 
organisational scope, more managerial research typically applies a 
‘relational’ logic to supply arrangements. Indeed such an approach is often 
positioned as being distinct from the ‘impersonal, discrete and short-term’ 
transaction-based approach. Contracts have been presented as a manifestation 
of power that can be effective in certain circumstances, but more often 
promote conflict (Gaski, 1984) and defensive behaviour (Hirschman, 1984). 
The relational perspective emphasises the role of trust in achieving mutually 
successful supply outcomes. The industrial network model developed by the 
Industrial Marketing and Purchasing (IMP) group (Håkansson and Snehota, 
1995) for example suggests that inter-organisational relationships develop 
when two companies build up activity links, resource ties, and actor bonds. 
Relational governance mechanisms therefore, based upon social processes, 
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like trust, that promote norms of flexibility, solidarity and information 
exchange, can safeguard, albeit informally, against exchange hazards and 
facilitate the enforcement of obligations (Baker et al., 2002; Granovetter, 
1973; Granovetter, 1985; Gulati, 1995; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). 
Similarly, unforeseeable contingencies may be accommodated by a bilateral 
approach to problem solving which facilitates adaptations – especially within 
a long-term relationship (Zand, 1972). A variety of enforcement mechanisms 
such as the expectation of repeat business, reputation effects, social 
obligations, and fulfilment of basic social needs are likely to encourage 
exchange-specific investments (Poppo and Zenger, 2002) and support the use 
of relational governance (Zhou and Poppo, 2006). Conversely, Larson (1992) 
highlights that the development and maintenance of relational governance, 
including a network of social ties, may be time and resource consuming. 
Intensive social ties may restrict companies from acquiring information and 
spotting new opportunities outside their networks (Uzzi, 1997). Equally, as 
scale and scope of exchange increases, exchanges are simply harder to 
maintain and sanction through long-standing ties because repeat business and 
cultural homogeneity are less likely (North 1990). 
The relational perspective suggests that exchange parties develop, test, 
observe and confirm the existence of cooperative relationships over time and 
therefore, it is asserted, relational governance can operate as a self-enforcing 
safeguard which effectively and - in certain circumstances - more efficiently 
substitutes for contracts. 
 
2.3. Links between contractual and relational governance 
Although contractual and relational mechanisms have been positioned as 
substitute arrangements; in isolation, both perspectives have significant 
limitations. For example, a contract can never stipulate every potential 
contingency and an excessively detailed contract can be both inflexible and 
difficult to monitor ex-post (Macaulay, 1963; Macneil, 1980) meaning that, 
paradoxically, exchange governance over-reliant on contractual mechanisms 
may lack enforcement capabilities. Conversely, if relational governance goes 
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beyond calculative self-interest it can yield blind trust, which will not survive 
in competitive environments (Williamson, 1993). 
Various studies have emphasised the essentially complementary 
characteristics of different governance arrangements (Larson, 1992; Poppo 
and Zenger, 2002; Zucker, 1986). Some authors arguing that the joint use of 
contractual and relational mechanisms generates more efficient outcomes 
than the use of either in isolation (Klein-Woolthuis et al., 2005; North, 1990). 
Clearly articulated terms, remedies, and processes of dispute resolution in 
combination with relational norms of solidarity, bilateralism, and continuance 
may yield greater confidence to cooperate (Baker et al., 1994). 
Some studies have also explored the dynamic and contingent nature of the 
inter-relationship. For example, formal safeguards may support relationships 
in their earlier, more vulnerable phases (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). Equally, 
relational governance strongly complements contractual processes when 
facilitating continuity in the face of changes and conflicts (Macneil, 1978). 
Although there is a reasonable body of evidence to support an integrative 
view of contractual and relational governance as complementary 
mechanisms, the precise nature of their inter-relationship is much less well 
documented. In particular, there is little in-depth empirical research 
examining how, why and when contracts and relational mechanisms 
complement and/or substitute for each other (Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005). 
 
2.4. Public-Private Partnerships 
Public sector service provision has become more dynamic and diverse 
(Kooiman, 1993) whilst facing budgetary constraints and a corresponding 
pressure to become more effective and efficient (Bouckaert and Halachmi, 
1995). Attempting to resolve this apparent contradiction, many governments 
have turned to Public-Private Partnership arrangements where private 
organisations deliver long-term infrastructure projects, and then operate and 
manage them following an output specification from the public sector 
purchaser (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2003; Grout, 1997). A growing number 
of European, in particular the UK, Portugal and Spain, and non-European 
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countries, in particular Australia and the US, make significant use of private 
sector capabilities and capital in a range of infrastructure-related projects 
such as bridges, tunnels, rails, roads, airports and canals (Confederation of 
British Industry, 2007; Walder and Amenta, 2004). The Public-Private 
Partnership (PPP) label covers a number of different arrangements including 
the Private Finance Initiative first established by the UK government in 1992. 
This was conceived as a mechanism for ‘purchas[ing] quality services on a 
long-term basis so as to take advantage of private sector management skills 
incentivized by having private finance at risk’ (the Stationery Office, 2000). 
To illustrate the scale of this market, more than one thousand PPP contracts 
have been signed in the EU in the last 15 years, representing a capital value 
of almost 200 billion euro (Blanc-Brude et al. 2007). The UK remains the 
lead user of such arrangements however, with successive UK governments 
deploying PPP/PFI investment vehicles as the principal method for procuring 
public sector capital projects and delivering associated services. (Broadbent 
and Laughlin, 2005). By March 2006, UK PFI contracts for the construction 
of schools, prisons, bridges, hospitals, roads and military equipment 
accounted for a capital value of around £50 billion (H.M. Treasury, 2006). 
Fig. 1 presents the distinctive phases of a typical PPP/PFI project. 
 
[Please INSERT: Fig. 1. Generic timeline for a PFI project ABOUT 
HERE] 
 
2.5. Contractual and relational governance in PPP/PFI 
PPP/PFI contracts are complex (typically consisting of multiple agreements 
covering the design, building, finance and operation phases of a project) and 
incomplete (parties can not specify legally enforceable safeguards for the vast 
number of future contingencies at the outset of a 30 years relationship) 
(Grimey and Lewis, 2004; Hart, 2003; Parker and Hartley, 2003). Moreover, 
long-term PFI supply arrangements tend to increase asset specificity (Bennett 
and Iossa, 2006; Lonsdale, 2005) and uncertainty related to long-term 
supplier commitment (Leiringer, 2006).  Against this backdrop, researchers 
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have identified a number of significant challenges associated with formal 
inter-organisational governance. For example, operational (e.g. traffic 
volumes) and whole life costing forecasts are central to the PPP bidding 
process, yet ex-ante, there is inevitably a lack of reliable and consistent data 
(El-Haram et al., 2002). 
Given these challenges to contractual governance, the literature suggests the 
countervailing importance of relationships in co-ordinating intra- and inter-
organisational networks with a multiplicity of stakeholders (Tranfield et al., 
2005). Koppenjan (2005) for example, argues that early interaction may help 
to develop common understanding and mutual trust and thus positively 
impact on contract negotiation. Conversely, there are significant embedded 
difficulties with the effective application of relational mechanisms in public-
private relationships such as power imbalance (Grimshaw et al., 2002), post-
contractual supplier lock-in (Lonsdale, 2005), divergent values and 
strategies2 in both contractual negotiations and subsequent performance 
management (Teisman and Klijn, 2004), and inappropriate risk and benefit 
sharing (Dixon et al., 2005; Erridge and Greer, 2002). 
 
3. Research methodology  
This research explored the detail and dynamics of contractual and relational 
governance mechanisms and their changing significance over time. In order 
to investigate these phenomena in their natural context (Pettigrew 1985), 
generating the rich qualitative and quantitative data sets that are particularly 
important for the measurement of complex and intangible phenomena, the 
case study method was selected (Yin, 2002). Two Design, Build, Finance and 
Operate (DBFO) PFI projects were investigated: a hospital and an emergency 
services training facility. Table 1 summarises the key characteristics of the 
cases. Some data have been disguised for reasons of confidentiality. 
 
                                               
2 It has been argued that many of the UK Private Finance Initiative contracts have been 
influenced more by politics than economic rationality (Lonsdale 2005). 
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[Please insert: Table 1: Overview of key features of two PFI case studies, 
about here] 
 
Although, inevitably, the projects differ in some key aspects they were both 
selected as well established exchange relationships - at the time of the 
research both had reached the operation stage. The hospital was among the 
‘first wave’ of PFI healthcare projects in the UK, while the training facility 
was a ‘pathfinder’ PFI project for the emergency services. Equally, as early 
projects, both were governed by bespoke concession agreements that detail 
the roles and responsibilities of the various different parties concerning the 
different phases of the PFI. 
Although a longitudinal approach in its pure form, which means following 
the contract over 25 or 30 years, was impractical, retrospective data was 
collected using the respondent-driven critical incident technique (Bitner et 
al., 1990; Flanagan, 1954). Critical incidents or events that had a positive or 
negative impact on the relationship that occurred during the different PFI 
project phases (i.e. procurement/bidding, construction and operation phases) 
were mapped along a timeline. While the case study method aims to deliver a 
global case description, the critical incident technique maps critical incidents 
as experienced by individual respondents.  
Thirty-five semi-structured, face-to-face interviews with different key 
stakeholders (lasting between one to two hours) were conducted over a 
period of two years. This includes fifteen interviews with public sector 
organisations and twenty with private sector organisations. The research 
acknowledged the complex network associated with PFI case studies and thus 
data collection moved beyond the dyadic relationship. Additional interviews 
were conducted with key stakeholders such as sub-contractors and relevant 
government departments. The breadth of interviewees was necessary to 
capture a variety of perspectives and build rich insights relating to different 
phases of the two projects. All interviews were taped and transcribed, whilst 
the confidentiality of participating organisations and individuals was assured. 
Reliability of interview data was strengthened through triangulation of data 
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sources including secondary sources such as company documentation and 
reports from HM Treasury and the Audit Commission. 
NVivo7 was used to support analysis of the interview transcripts and the 
critical incidents highlighted. Specific coding included contextual variables 
and the level of significance attached to the use of relational (RELN) and 
contractual (CTR) governance mechanisms. Measuring significance of use of 
contractual governance was based on any indication of documentary changes 
or explicit referral event – often with 3rd party legal support being involved. 
Given that a precise calibration of relational governance was problematic, a 
proxy measure rating the significance of specific inter-personal relationships 
was used. This was based on Zaheer’s et al. (1998) study of inter-personal 
trust between firms’ boundary spanners. Coding items included dimensions 
such as reliability, credibility, fairness, goodwill and competence across 
individuals (Seppaenen et al., 2007). For each critical event, an interpretative 
assessment was then made of the relative magnitude of both mechanisms 
(using a simple 3-point scale: high, medium, low) and this was then plotted 
along the project timeline, providing a graphical illustration of governance 
interplay over time. In addition, to facilitate our interpretation of 
commonalities and differences between cases, data matrices were used (Miles 
and Huberman, 1994) to analyse changes in key contextual variables in 
relation to changing patterns of governance mechanisms. 
 
4. Case findings 
This section presents a description of the two cases with key findings 
presented along the project phases. 
 
4.1. Hospital 
Faced with a regional requirement to expand healthcare capacity in order to 
meet rising demand, a decision was taken to replace a town centre hospital 
which had been built in the late 1950s and centralise a number of other health 
facilities into one large, new, hospital on a ‘greenfield’ site outside the town. 
The new hospital was designed, built, financed and operated (DBFO) by a 
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private contractor. Fig. 2 shows the variety of organisations involved in the 
project. The principle public-private arrangement is a long-term contractual 
relationship between a single National Health Service (NHS) Trust3 and a 
private partner, a company that combines both a building and a facility 
management (FM) division. This concession agreement covers a total of 30 
years combined product and service provision, split into two distinct phases. 
The first phase covers three years of designing and building the hospital, 
whereas the second phase covers the service provision over a time period of 
27 years. 
 
[Please INSERT:  Fig. 2. Overview of hospital PFI structure ABOUT 
HERE] 
 
Since signing the contract in the late 1990s, the contract has been modified to 
accommodate changes in the stakeholder equity structure and, in 2003 the 
concession agreement, an umbrella contract covering the rights and 
obligations during the construction and operation phases, was adjusted to 
incorporate additional capacity in the form of a multi-bed Diagnostic 
Treatment Centre at an additional cost of almost £30M. Interestingly, several 
interviewees from the Trust expressed concern that the Hospital Company’s4 
main objectives focused too much on the financing/re-financing of the deal 
and not on the ‘entirety’ of the PFI contract. 
 
Bidding and procurement 
Although the initial bidding process was put on hold during a general 
election, it resumed after the election of a new government who confirmed 
their commitment to the policy. Overall, the bidding and contract negotiating 
process spanned five years. Given that there was a very limited supply 
                                               
3 National Health Service Trusts in England and Wales are not ‘legal’ trusts but are better 
described as public sector corporations. Each trust (in this case focused around hospitals) is 
headed by a board consisting of executive and non-executive directors, and is chaired by a 
non-executive director. 
4
 The Hospital Company is a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), consisting of a consortium of 
three major equity shareholders, including another division of the prime sub-contractor. 
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market for such complex performance provision, only two companies bid for 
this project, the relationship between the public and private organisations 
could be best characterised as supplier-dominant. The small number of 
bidders can be traced back to a relatively underdeveloped PFI supply market 
in the late 1990s. The successful contractor was one of only a few players in 
the PFI market with experience of designing, building, financing and 
operating a hospital. Moreover, the NHS Trust had limited understanding 
and, by definition as an early project, almost no experience of PFI 
procurement processes. All of these factors contributed to an environment 
where there was limited inter-organisational and inter-personal trust during 
the bidding and contract negotiation phases. Interviewees talked of ‘[…] an 
aggressive contract approach […] and management style […]’ adopted in 
the early project phases. Difficulties also arose with ineffective information 
flow across organisations at this early project phase. For instance, a 
contractor interviewee pointed out that the public partner did not inform them 
about affordability problems which arose in the early phases of the project. 
This miscommunication between the parties led to costly and time-
consuming redesign and renegotiation processes. Furthermore, it was difficult 
to develop inter-personal relationships with a high turnover of key personnel 
in the NHS Trust project team. 
The contract was perceived by both parties as playing a central role in 
governing the complex, long-term supply arrangement, in minimising risks 
and consequently achieving desired project outcomes. As a result, an 
extensive bespoke and expensive contract was drafted to govern the 
relationship between the Trust and its private contractor. It addresses issues 
such as reporting and information sharing, performance measures, payment 
mechanisms and dispute resolution and termination procedures. 
 
Design and construction 
During the design and construction phase, the public-private exchange was 
still characterised by a lack of trust and adversarial, short-term oriented 
behaviour was common. Contractual governance mechanisms were found by 
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most interviewees to be predominating in the exchange at this time. One 
NHS Trust interviewee described the project manager of the construction 
sub-contractor as ‘[…] an aggressive, old-fashioned contractor man, who has 
taken the role that these people had to perform to the contract’. However, 
both parties experienced various problems when implementing and operating 
the bespoke contract in a day-to-day operation. For example, the building 
sub-contractor installed a cheaper hospital lift option that, in the short-term, 
yielded cost-effectiveness but led in the long-term to higher maintenance 
costs and service disruptions during the operating phase. The lift problem 
occurred because the contract did not clearly specify the necessary 
requirements for a whole-life costing approach. Several interviewees 
highlighted how early PFI contracts were more challenging because of the 
limited amount of data relating to issues such as life-cycle costs of products. 
Furthermore, there was a great deal of post-contractual variations. One NHS 
Trust interviewee pointed out ‘[…] it’s been a fair few post-contract 
variations and that’s probably because the specs weren’t robust or the way 
that people want to change’. 
 
Operation 
Once the exchange had entered its operations phase, the buyer began working 
with a different division of the prime contractor. At this point there was also 
evidence of greater bilateral awareness of the benefits of a long-term and 
collaborative relationship. A more informal approach, still in combination 
with contractual governance mechanisms, was cited as having been more 
effective in solving day-to-day operational difficulties. For example, a few 
months into this phase, key project stakeholders used an off-site ‘away-day’ 
to develop and shape the relationships among senior personnel. Various 
working groups consisting of personnel from each organisation were set up to 
work on specific service improvement activities. The evidence of this more 
balanced approach to governance was particularly evident in the approach to 
developing and implementing the 5-year benchmarking and market 
(re)testing procedures set out in the contract. The Trust and the FM sub-
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contractor, together with the Hospital Company, developed common 
objectives and procedures to facilitate a more effective benchmarking 
procedure for all parties. These developments aside, there was still evidence 
of a lack of trust between the hospital company, the Trust and the prime 
contractor. One Trust interviewee pointed out that ‘there is always an 
interesting dilemma in terms of how open book a relationship is […]’. As a 
specific illustration, poor information sharing on life-cycle costing hindered 
the development of an effective through-life building and equipment 
maintenance programme. 
 
4.2. Emergency services training facility  
In the mid-1990s a number of UK emergency services personnel lost their 
lives in various operational incidents. Resultant Health and Safety Executive 
investigations suggested that a possible cause of these incidents was a lack of 
practical and realistic training. Central Government subsequently urged all 
emergency services and their local government overseers to invest in high 
quality training. The case study project was a joint initiative between three 
regional emergency service providers seeking to achieve economies of scale 
from a shared training facility. Fig. 3 presents an overview of the different 
key stakeholders involved in the project. The principle public-private 
arrangement is a long-term contractual relationship - for the design and build 
of a state of the art training facility and its subsequent operations including 
the delivery of training services – between these three public clients and a 
private partner. Design and build work was sub-contracted to a construction 
company while the long-term FM service provision was sub-contracted to the 
prime contractor’s own business division 
 
[Please INSERT: Fig. 3 Overview of emergency services PFI structure 
ABOUT HERE] 
 
Bidding and procurement 
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A number of firms expressed early interest in the contract and, as a result, the 
buyer ran workshops and presentation days (supported by their legal and 
financial advisors) to help manage the pre-bidding process. Eventually, 5 
firms submitted formal tenders and one was selected as preferred bidder. 
Interestingly, although neither partner had any direct previous experience of 
PFI contracts, with experienced external support the bidding and contract 
negotiation phase took place on a largely informal basis and focused mainly 
on evaluating the competences and trustworthiness of the partner. Equally, 
although the relationship did not build on previous experience of working 
together, the public buyers’ project manager stated that a trusting relationship 
was established before the parties signed the contract. For instance, prior to 
signing the contract the private partner took on the risks and investments 
involved in finding an appropriate site for the training centre, thereby clearly 
signalling a commitment to making the project a success. The project 
manager emphasised the importance of having a private partner who took ‘all 
the risks, all the investments and so on and they are getting nothing back 
until of course we [the emergency services] start to occupy our training 
centre on day one […]’.   
The development of an early trusting relationship was based primarily on 
inter-personal relationships between boundary-spanners from both 
organisations. The training centre’s director reported that the private partner's 
representative during the building phase ‘[…] talked the [Emergency 
Services] language [and] he did more than the job […]’. Although this phase 
was characterised by relational governance mechanisms such as trust and 
information sharing, the outcome of the negotiating phase was a very detailed 
contract. The various contract clauses focused on safeguarding property 
rights and spill-over including, for instance, costing structures, secrecy of 
information, ownership, division of labour, duration of cooperation, and 
various procedures for relationship termination. The contract also included 
clauses on the project’s management side such as project plans and meeting 
frequency. 
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Design and construction 
Interviewees from both parties stressed the point that their successful 
experience in the earlier project phases made them confident that they could 
jointly achieve a successful construction of the training centre and associated 
service delivery. However, the high level of inter-personal trust, based on the 
commitment of both parties during the pre-contractual phase could not be 
fully sustained once a key boundary-spanner from the private partner left the 
project. Nevertheless, the change in personnel did not completely ‘drain the 
reservoir’ of inter-organisational trust built up during the early project 
phases. For instance, during the construction phase relational mechanisms 
were deployed to solve problems regarding many ‘grey areas’ in the output 
specifications of the contract. The public partner’s project manager 
highlighted that ‘[…] even though we are starting from a point of zero 
knowledge […] we have evolved together, but need to be reflecting those 
changes in the actual contract […] but we have highlighted again that this is 
likely to be a permanent requirement [and] it might not be that we are 
meeting every month or so.’ 
 
Operation 
From the outset, both parties were willing to be flexible in the application of 
the contract (i.e. there was no enactment of penalty systems to punish non-
contractual fulfilments). For example, a malfunctioning water pipe system 
caused considerable damages to the training centre’s gymnasium in the early 
days of operation, thus impacting its availability for some time. The public 
partner was contractually eligible to claim back financial losses caused by the 
water damage, but decided to solve the problem using relational governance 
mechanisms instead of contractual mechanisms. The training centre manager 
explained that ‘[…] there is lots of stuff going on underneath the contract, 
unwritten, that keeps the place [training centre] running […]’. Indeed 
despite the emphasis placed by both parties - during the contract negotiation 
phase - on ensuring that legally enforceable safeguards were in place, several 
interviewees stated that they sometimes felt tied down by the detailed 
  18 
contract. Consequently, in order to simplify the contractual terms of day-to-
day operations, a set of agreements covering aspects of the operation phase 
were used instead of following the complex and detailed contract. 
The relational governance approach was also found to be appropriate in 
dealing with contract variations during the early stages of operation. Instead 
of using a time-consuming contract variations process, it was agreed to 
implement contract changes on a yearly basis through a time efficient 
contract steering group made up of representative from both partners. The 
public sector’s project manager stated that ‘[…] every time something 
changed we [public and private partner] did not necessarily want to go 
running off to our various lawyers and spend a lot of time and money if there 
was just a minor change to the operational relationship […]’. Furthermore, 
collaborative behaviour based on a trusting relationship could also be 
witnessed among staff that worked together in the training centre on a day-to-
day basis. The private partner personnel provided administration support and 
all maintenance on-site while the public buyer provided training and support 
for managing domain-specific courses. 
 
5. Discussion 
This section is structured in two parts. The first revisits and extends the 
literature asserting the complementary nature of contractual and relational 
governance. The second explores the dynamics of contractual and relational 
governance. Both parts also reflect more generally on issues relating to the 
management of PPP/PFI projects. 
 
5.1. Contractual and relational governance 
The case data supports the broad assertion that contractual and relational 
governance are complementary exchange mechanisms, but also makes a 
more specific contribution to the debates on the relationship between 
contractual and relational mechanisms. 
 
Contractual governance 
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All partners in both of the cases aimed for comprehensiveness and a high 
degree of precision and clarity in their formal written agreements, resulting in 
contracts that contain hundreds of pages and a multitude of schedules and 
procedures. Inevitably, both projects experienced a prolonged bidding and 
contract negotiation (from official invitation for tenders to financial close) 
phase: more than 5 years for the £150+M hospital contract and more than 3 
years for the £20+M emergency services training facility. Yet despite the 
apparently exhaustive nature of this process, the number of subsequent 
significant contractual variations suggests that no matter how extensive the 
drafting process, any contract in such a complex exchange remains 
incomplete. In exploring motivations for this comprehensive approach to 
contractual governance, a number of explanations were evident using 
different frames and levels of analysis. For example, in both cases a 
politically motivated buyer (Lonsdale, 2005) faced increased exchange 
uncertainty because of the limited number of suppliers and, correspondingly, 
reduced ex-post control exerted by the shadow of the future (i.e. good 
behaviour enforced by prospects of future business). More pragmatically, as a 
public procurement process, there were numerous local, national and 
European regulatory issues that necessitated formal documentary process 
where a private buyer might seek an alternative (‘less bureaucratic’) 
approach. From a contract theory perspective, in addition to significant ex-
ante transactional (e.g. design and service specifications) and infrastructural 
(e.g. financial and organisational structures) complexity, the contracting 
process in both cases had to accommodate a nascent supply market and the 
uncertainties introduced by monitoring and enforcing contracts over extended 
timeframes. This seems to support Williamson’s (1985, 1991) assertion that 
the governance features of inter-organisational relationships will tend to 
match known exchange hazards. Indeed these ‘frictional’ costs (Coase, 1937) 
- together with the exchange-specific investments that create bilateral 
dependencies (Carney, 1998) - would lead a TCE analysis to conclude in-
house provision or hierarchy as the optimal governance solution. In other 
words, the policy impetus created a context where the potential for 
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opportunism increased the likelihood that all parties would engage in 
“difficult, expensive, and often counter-productive” (Holcomb and Hitt, 
2007) contracting. 
 
Relational governance 
Although, as the above discussion highlights, the development of both cases 
was substantially influenced – especially during the early project phases - by 
the structures of contractual governance, the role of other relational 
characteristics was also clearly evident. In fact, it is the approach to relational 
governance that marks the clearest difference between the two cases. The 
emergency services case suggests that trust can facilitate the negotiation and 
drafting of complex contracts; whereas the early phases of the hospital 
project were marked by a distinct lack of either inter-personal or inter-
institutional trust. For the emergency services training facility, the 
contracting process was interpreted as a tangible expression of the openness 
and psychological safety (Edmonson, 1999) that had already been built up 
between individuals and organisations. Although both contracts involved 
substantial bi-lateral investment the explicit attempts to develop trust in the 
early phases of the emergency services project were felt to have significantly 
helped with sensitive issues such as benefit sharing and relationship 
termination procedures. Moreover, as this project moved into its construction 
and operations phases, there was further evidence of relational governance 
mechanisms, increasing information sharing and encouraging joint-problem 
solving – sometimes outside the framework specified by the contract. 
Conversely, the relationships in the hospital case – in particular during the 
bidding, contract negotiation and early build phases – exhibited low levels of 
trust, with the divergent values and strategies of the public buyer and private 
contractor (in particular their construction division) strongly influencing both 
contractual negotiations and subsequent performance management. As a 
result, these early project phases were characterised by ineffective 
information flow across the partnering organisations and an absence of 
personal bonding and routinized behaviour. 
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5.2. The Dynamics of contractual and relational governance  
As previously explained in the methodology section, a graphical 
representation of the significance of relational (RELN) and contractual 
(CTR) governance at different critical incidents over time was developed for 
each of the case studies. Fig. 4 presents a summary of the data from the 
hospital case and Fig. 5 presents the data from the emergency service training 
facility case – both based around 4 indicative critical incidents. These are 
intended to provide an interpretative basis for discussion of the separate and 
combined dynamics of these different governance mechanisms. 
 
[Please insert: Fig. 4 Governance Dynamics in Hospital Case about here] 
 
In the hospital case, the relative emphases on different governance 
mechanisms follow what might be considered a typical trajectory for novel 
exchange arrangements. At the outset, with limited inter-personal contacts 
between new buyers and new suppliers, relational governance was of low 
significance. Faced with high levels of complexity and uncertainty, all parties 
put a great deal of emphasis on “getting the contract right” driving up the 
significance of contractual governance. Over time, relationships developed 
through accumulation of shared experience and, more pro-actively, through 
events such as the relationship away days. As a result, contractual 
governance began to be part of a more balanced managerial portfolio 
(although as one interviewee noted, “I still want everything in the contract”). 
It is important to highlight however that the exchange had entered the 
operations phase by this point and in addition to the different parameters and 
priorities of this more collaborative and service-oriented phase, the staff 
responsible for the relatively short-term bidding, negotiation and design/build 
phases had moved on to other projects. Equally, as a benchmarking/market 
testing event approached (the first point when, at least in theory, the FM sub-
contractor could be replaced) it seems likely the ‘shadow of the future’ was 
clearer and this may have created an additional supplier incentive for 
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collaboration. Observing the contractual and relational trajectories it is 
apparent that they do not follow simplistic, mirroring pattern (i.e. over time 
moving from contractual=high and relational=low to contractual=low and 
relational=high). In this case they have moved from opposing to equivalent 
(High/High in most recent operation phase) significance in the governance 
mix. These differential trajectories were also visible in the Emergency 
Services Case (Fig. 5).  
 
[Please insert: Fig. 5 Governance Dynamics in Emergency Services Case 
about here] 
 
At the start of this exchange process there was evidence of balance 
(Medium/Medium) between the mechanisms: the contracting process 
remained a crucial tool but there was also a serious and early emphasis on the 
relational component reflecting the efforts of two key ‘boundary-spanning’ 
individuals with trust in their counterparty (Fichman and Goodman, 1996; 
Rousseau et al., 1998). This balanced approach continued as the 
bid/contracting phase came to a close (High/High) and was perceived by 
participants as having helped to facilitate successful contract negotiation (e.g. 
the site search risks were taken by the preferred bidder prior to signing). 
After the supplier’s ‘boundary-spanner’ left the project during the build phase 
this inter-personal mechanism was effectively redundant (H/L). Over time, 
these relationships were re-built between new employees but considering the 
overall relational trajectory, although the significance of inter-personal trust 
dropped from high to low almost instantly, the reverse process appeared to be 
a slow sequential and incremental one. It was also interesting to note that 
even in this case, with far greater early emphasis on informal exchange, 
contractual governance was never categorized as low significance. Even 
during those incidents where the contract was effectively put to one side (e.g. 
the water pipe) to allow for rapid service recovery, there were subsequent 
revisions and, of course, it was only because all parties had a detailed 
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knowledge of the contractual arrangements that the implications of a ‘set 
aside’ were felt to be tolerable. 
 
6. Conclusions  
Before highlighting the key conclusions derived from analysis of the case 
material, it is important to reflect upon the work’s limitations. Some are 
generic: this was an exploratory study and although established literature was 
used to frame the investigations, there was no formal hypothesis development 
or testing. Other limitations are more specific to the study. Although the 
PPP/PFI focus provided an empirical structure for the study, this remains a 
complex and controversial policy instrument and as such all opinions need to 
be seen through a potentially political lens. Equally, as supply markets and 
the policy itself have matured the ‘first wave’ projects that formed the subject 
of this research may be less representative of current practice. Accepting 
these limitations, conclusions with practical and theoretical implications 
emerged in three principal areas. 
First, the work confirms that relational and contractual mechanisms are 
indeed complementary forms of exchange governance but, more specifically, 
relational assumptions, experiences and intentions of all parties appear to 
actively frame whether the contract and contracting process is interpreted as a 
sign of distrust or a written manifestation of commitment. In managerial 
terms (for a PPP/PFI arrangement) there is evidence that contractual 
governance capability should be seen as a crucial but not sufficient ‘qualifier’ 
for effective exchange and therefore needs to act in combination with pro-
active relational governance.  
Second, the trajectories of relational and contractual governance appear to 
have different characteristics. There is evidence that although relational 
governance based upon inter-personal trust follows an incremental, 
cumulative trajectory it is capable of being rapidly diminished. Contractual 
governance mechanisms are also incremental but cannot move with the same 
degree of freedom (i.e. once a complex contract is constructed it doesn’t 
easily erode) and therefore ‘anchor’ the exchange throughout the life cycle. 
  24 
This also reflects the different drivers at work: contractual mechanisms – 
especially in PPP/PFI arrangements – are heavily constrained by exogenous 
regulatory factors, whereas relational governance is much more amenable to 
managerial control. In terms of managerial implications, certain techniques 
relating to the use of boundary-spanners seem to be very effective in 
developing relational mechanisms. 
Finally, the different development characteristics of relational and contractual 
mechanisms mean that their dynamic interplay does not follow consistent 
patterns. Although extant literature (Poppo and Zenger 2002) has already 
argued that contractual safeguards can support relationships in their earlier, 
more vulnerable phases (i.e. CTR=High/RELN=Low) this longitudinal 
research has found evidence of the consistent stabilising effect of contractual, 
even complex contractual, governance - especially given the ongoing 
potential fragility of (inter-personal) relational mechanisms. In managerial 
terms, it may be worth reflecting on the positive aspects of ongoing 
contractual refinements: as a basis for building and re-building trust and in 
extended (PPP/PFI) supply arrangements where key staffs regularly move on, 
as a vehicle for capturing and retaining exchange specific learning and 
knowledge. 
 
7. Further Work 
The issues explored in this paper suggest a number of areas that would 
benefit from further conceptual and empirical work. Additional longitudinal 
research will help to illustrate whether the complementary relationships 
identified in these case studies are idiosyncratic or representative of more 
generalisable patterns. Moreover, although only a representational device in 
this paper, the governance dynamic diagrams appear to have great potential. 
Further development of key measurement constructs (e.g. for measuring both 
inter-organisational and inter-personal trust) would add significantly to their 
descriptive and prescriptive value. Building on this discussion, an 
investigation of the link between particular trust building techniques and 
exchange performance at different stages of the life cycle could yield 
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contingent policy and managerial insight. Finally, this research has suggested 
some surprising benefits from idiosyncratic and complex contracting and yet 
recent UK PPP/PFI projects have begun employing simpler, standardised 
contractual forms – in part reflecting increasingly mature supply markets. 
Correspondingly, the role of contractual complexity requires further critical 
reflection and investigation. 
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 Hospital Emergency service training 
facility  
Product-service 
provision 
Design, build, finance and 
operate (DBFO). Hard 
(estate) and soft FM service 
Design, build, finance and 
operate (DBFO). Emergency 
services training facilities 
and soft FM service 
OJEU/OJEC 
advert 
Mid-1990s Late 1990s 
Financial close Late 1990s Early 2000s 
Operation since Late 2002 Early 2003 
Contract nature 
and value  
Non-standard contract worth 
approx. £150M. 
Non-standard contract worth 
approx. £20M. 
Contract duration 30 years  25 years 
Complexity of 
public-private 
network  
1 NHS Trust as buyer; a 
private sector consortium 
comprising 3 equal equity 
investors, 1 investor also 
being a prime sub-contractor 
for both design; build and 
facility management 
services. 
3 different local authorities 
as buyer; 1 contractor that is 
both sole investor and FM 
service contractor; various 
sub-contractors used for 
design and build. 
 
Table 1. Overview of key features of hospital and emergence services 
training facility PFI case studies 
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Fig. 1. Generic timeline for a PFI project (with indicative key events) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Overview of hospital PFI structure 
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Fig. 3. Overview of emergency services PFI structure 
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Fig. 4. Governance dynamics in hospital case 
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Fig. 5. Governance dynamics in emergency services case 
 
 
 
